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ABSTRACT  
The design of what is outlined in this paper is not confined to study the port of Sines in 
a logic of pure port management, not even only as the decomposed observation of flows 
originated by the so-called industrial complex, since until now, the economic history 
was charged of such anatomical structural analysis. What is called for is beyond the 
mere circumstances prevailing or the sum of the parts and aims to look Sines in a 
multidimensional way as an open system, characterized by how parts are organized and 
how together they can contribute to economic revitalization, sustainable development 
and social cohesion of a considerable portion of the national territory. In other words, 
we assume the possibility of the occurrence of a regional cluster supported on the global 
networks of the maritime chain.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Four major outcomes as drivers in the export sector breakdown of our economy for the 
last (lost) ten years, were identified: i) the euro as national currency caused an 
appreciation of the exchange rate and the correspondent loss of competitiveness; ii) the 
euro effect has raised the unitary costs of work; iii) weak added value incorporation to 
products and services and, iv) emphasis given to non-tradable sectors of the economy. 
Plus, with the WTO entry of China and other emerging and EU accession in 2004 of 
Eastern Europe countries, where labor costs are lower than the national average, trade 
imbalances have worsened. Accordingly, and facing the current state of the economy, it 
is of paramount importance to look at the export sector as subject of the greater 
attention, as a way to reduce the external deficit and debt, in order to promote for 
increasingly competitive and innovative companies to arise.  
Such design necessarily involves identifying which (companies), how to (achieve this 
goal) and where (to locate them). This is part of the contribution this paper proposes to 
discuss about Sines as a cluster consisting of firms able to incorporate high-tradable 
value. Now that re-emerges in the economic analysis, the importance of the economy of 
the sea and the demand for new export markets, the maritime component of the 
economy appears as an inevitability and as a challenge to the adoption of a policy, for 
an industry that presents itself as strategic. In this sense, Sines is configured as a key 
asset in the context of the national economy due to the process of globalization.  
The economic future and further development of Sines region, is actually connected to 
the dynamics of the port which must produce centrifugal forces that encourages, 
through ripple effect, the benefits beyond the natural boundary contradicting the level 
of disconnection that can exist, especially in a region where the coastline continues to 
be the main interface zone. Access to the interior will be certainly improved, implying 
that most of the economic activities will be located further inland and not, as has 
conventionally been the case, in the vicinity of its terminals. With the increase of the 
port influence on the regional socio-economic fabric, the next announced phase will be 
the regionalization of the port hinterland, a process that describes the enlargement of a 
seaport activity in the hinterland. According to this model (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 
2005), the regional port activity expands through the adoption of various strategies, 
linking it more strongly to logistics centers for distribution in the inland, which 
increases the geographic scale of port activity beyond the boundaries of the port.  
This new condition and new role gives to port a higher dimension in geostrategic terms 
which requires talking about port infrastructure, the supply chain and associated 
transport modes. Sines it is therefore included in the scope of the geostrategic economic 
areas and global networks of maritime chain analysis, understanding by that the sea, 
the port and the logistics markets.  
With the widening of the Panama Canal and facing a possible increase in trans-
Atlantic shipping routes by this waterway, it should be anticipated which are the 
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potential in terms of attracting cargo flows to the port, without turning Sines into a mere 
intermediary transshipment hub.  
A regional cluster supported on the economy of the sea as defined by the EC, "is 
devoted to the development of marine economy through innovation and approach 
between research, training and industry. Accompanying research projects, promote 
SME access to new markets and is thus fully inscribed in the objectives of the Lisbon 
strategy - which attaches great importance to innovation policies”. 
Innovation is a necessity in the maritime domain (as well as national) and provides the 
embryonic ability for the gestation of a regional cluster of this nature, giving special 
attention to the shipbuilding and logistics, energy and exploitation of marine biological 
resources, including the bet on renewable energy produced by currents, waves and tides, 
the development of new medicines from marine biodiversity, risk prevention, security, 
monitoring and combating the effects of climate change and to developing sustainable 
tourism that integrates the shoreline protection. We should look at projects of the same 
order of strategic importance raised in Finland, where skills that arises across industrial 
area of nanotechnology to the technology of paper production, through research in 
artificial intelligence and in to alternative energies are developed. 
Following this programmatic line, Sines should be seen as both a geostrategic 
platform, with regard to the direct action of port authority on the power delegated by 
the national government and as a geo-economic asset, according to the overall national 
policy.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The content of this paper is described as it follows: Section 1 presents a comprehensive 
overview on the port of Sines as a national strategic asset. Analyzes the sea-land 
interface macrostructure and set out some crucial principles to the survival in the war 
that exists in terms of cargo attraction: competitiveness and centrality. This section is 
also dedicated to study the importance of port performance measured in terms of 
efficiency (productivity) and effectiveness (loyalty, or customer driven). In this context, 
there is the concern to raise its performance for the effective management control and 
the consequent strategic reorientation in order to increase competitiveness;  
Section 2 casts a glance at Sines as a logistics platform (logistics gateway) and 
multiplier effects on the regional socio-economic fabric. Thus, to railroad freight should 
be attributed a fundamental core importance in the context of the supply chain 
continuity. It is in this context that an analysis about the urgent adoption of the 
European gauge and the direct rail link to the region of Madrid is conducted, so to not 
convert Sines as a mere branch line connection to Spain. Therefore interconnectivity 
outweighs, something that constitutes the "backbone" of the regionalization process of 
port activity and the sole way to gain market share at land;  
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Section 3 is devoted to quantitative studies. In this aspect were performed two analyzes: 
the degree of specialization / diversification by calculating an index and its relationship 
in terms of asymmetries - Gini coefficient applied to disaggregated cargo volumes in the 
main Iberian ports - which is an attempt to assess the current level of dependence of 
Sines over the peninsular port system. A second, which regards the development of 
cargo handling in the last ten years through the Location Coefficient, in order to 
understand trends in convergence / divergence of Sines compared with four ports: the 
port range B-B; Barcelona, Valencia, Algeciras and Bilbao, with which it requires 
greater peninsular inter-port competition, as an indicator of the extent of the overall port 
performance;  
In Section 4, the potential of Sines as the outbreak of a regional cluster supported by 
the maritime chain emerges, framed in a setting designed in the 2030 prospective 
horizon, set in the context of global trends in maritime trade, on a basis of the demand 
scenarios for transport and energy produced by iTREN-2030, and the OECD 
macroeconomic forecasts for the same period: Moderate Recovery Scenario, although 
these scenarios have been formulated with post economic crisis assumptions;  
At last, in Section 5, we proceed to present the final conclusions that synthesize the 
results obtained in all analyzes performed along the different sections and which will be 
exhibited in the form of a final report.  
 
1. The port of Sines: past, present and future  
Past  
In 1971 the option to build a large new refinery in the south of the country was taken, in 
a deepwater site with special conditions to receive large oil tankers, to make feasible re-
exportations of refined petroleum products. This project would make country´s refining 
capacity increases, with which it would lay the foundation of a diversified 
petrochemical industry. It was a project that was intended to be built and equipped with 
appropriate facilities and equipment in order to attract the installation of other industrial 
activities. The underlying vision was "concentrationist", based in the principles of the 
best land use and supported in the harmonious and balanced progress of all regions. 
Sines represents an attempt to create a pole of development which susceptibility would 
lead to mitigate the strong attraction exerted by cities as Lisbon and Oporto and 
counteract the generator effects leading to diseconomies that these regions, already 
congested at the time, began to show. However, Sines effectively represented a situation 
of local industrialization without promoting regional development of the south neither 
for the Alentejo region. The effects of its presence were felt only in the coastal strip, 
providing economic indicators surprisingly a-consentaneous with the reality of the 
interior: it is a region with a GDP per capita or either a GDP per person employed even 
above Lisbon´s region average. What these indicators translate into welfare and 
economic development is what we advocate to reply in a regional dimension.  
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Present  
Until recently, Sines, in the strict sense, assumed the role of an industrial complex and 
at the same time was synonymous of a port whose energetic vocation allowed to be 
considered as a strategic asset, though far from truly contributing to the decrease of 
cyclical dependency that characterizes Portuguese economy. A new configuration, 
which started in 2003 with the commitment of the containerized segment, came to give 
a new life and allow it to have been released from the extreme dependency as 
petrochemical port, creating new business opportunities through cargo diversification 
(Figure 1). In the short term, a new nature as a port open to different markets can drive, 
through the participation of new actors into the creation of industrial and logistics hubs 
along the distribution chain - action - to which the effects of a dynamic port spreads to 
hinterland - reaction - reformatting Sines in a privileged axis at the crossroads of 
maritime routes.  
Figure 1: Container throughput in the port of Sines (2004-2012) 
 
     Source: Own elaboration (from APS statistics).  
 
The Port of Sines Authority (APS) manages the infrastructure and space delivering the 
operation and maintenance of terminals to private concession - the superstructure. This 
scheme, called Landlord port in the jargon of international port management, reveals a 
structural framework that, as Ng and Pallis (2010) point to the case of Greek ports, 
involves the ownership and government intervention: the concept of public good is 
prevalent and public ports are undirected controlled by States (through board of 
directors), in contrast to British ports, (tended private), or the northern European, 
administered by joint city council (board of advisors), in the Hanseatic model tradition.  
The Landlord port model presents the utmost trend towards adoption (Tovar, Trujillo 
and Jara-Díaz, 2004; Verhoeven, 2009). In the case of Sines, property assumes the 
public nature and the activities of loading and unloading at its terminals, delivered to 
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private operators. However, even working within this specific legal framework, APS 
performs functions simultaneously as Landlord port, as a regulator and as operator. As a 
Landlord port, manages the assets under its jurisdiction. It refers in particular to the 
provision of infrastructure such as docks and mooring jetties or dredging. As a 
regulator, the APS sets the regulatory framework in terms of tariffs, customs and 
security procedures. As operator, provides daily supplies to ships – towage and 
bunkering as well as salvage if needed.  
The most valuable asset of a port, for its intrinsic value and scarcity, is land. In the 
Landord model, the land is owned by a public body or the Port Authority itself, while 
the management of superstructures is delivered to private sector, giving the result that 
the focus of competitive strategy has moved from the port itself to its terminals. In 
Sines, the container terminal is operated by PSA, a specialized global player in the 
market of global container terminals, which fixed the prices for services performed. The 
determining factor behind the choice of concessioning these activities was the reduction 
of the bureaucracy and the application of labor flexibility and entrepreneurship (Ng and 
Pallis, 2010), because the port authorities typically have poor levels of performance in 
managing these structures, (The World Bank, 2007), for reasons of public financial 
effort reduction (Tovar, Trujillo and Jara-Díaz, 2004) and the change of corporate 
culture (Verhoeven, 2011), although economic theory cannot unequivocally prove these 
assumptions (Tongzon and Heng, 2005).  
As an entity dependent on the authority of the Ministry of Economy, major 
programmatic lines are issued by this governing body. Thus it is interesting to unveil 
what it proposes to implement in terms of port related policies. The Strategic 
Transport Master-Plan 2011-2015 (PET) approved in October 2011, highlights the 
importance now attributed to the sea, hence emphasizing its status as a natural border 
and as a resource throughout our EEZ, and indeed the only sector of the economy to 
which is assigned an investment effort for years to come (PET: 70). Under this Plan, the 
port and maritime sector plays a key role for the development of the country; exports by 
sea should be therefore improved and strengthen the country's competitiveness in this 
sector.  
The Maritime Chain and port macrostructure  
The four main functional elements that define a sea-land interface are: foreland, 
hinterland, modes of transport and port system. The first, foreland, is above all the 
maritime space in which a port trades and can be identified with the point of origin of 
the maritime networks (maritime chain). Networks represent all maritime movements, 
port logistics and distribution. The second, hinterland, it is the space within a port has 
trade relations. This can be divided into primary hinterland - the geographical space of 
the market for which a terminal is the closest - and competitive hinterland, used to 
describe the market areas over which the terminal has to compete with others for 
business. The notion of primary hinterland with well defined limits has dimmed because 
many hinterland became discontinuous, a process facilitated by the development of 
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corridors and inland terminals (Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack, 2006). Yet, competitive 
hinterland tends to be discontinuous due the density of the source or destination of loads 
be smaller, the effect of the accessibility of transport corridors and inland terminals 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Sines and the maritime chain (outbound flow). 
 
             Source: Adapted from Rodrigue, Comtois e Slack, 2006.  
 
Each mode of transport is structured as a corridor that provides access to the hinterland 
and the inland logistics platforms (inland hubs) which act as intermodal and transmodal 
centers. As to the latter concept, the port system in this case can be seen as a set of 
intermodal infrastructure serving the port operations.  
Future  
The expansion of the Panama Canal, with a direct link from the Pacific to Atlantic for 
larger ships, with the consequent efficiencies of scale, may lead to an increased flow of 
trade between the Pacific basin, both coasts of North America, the Mercosur and 
Europe. Sines emerge as an Atlantic front in this battle as it wants to capture part of this 
traffic. The question that arises is if whether its geostrategic position and capabilities 
will allow, and how, to achieve this goal.  
Contrary to what has been anticipated for the ports of the North American coasts and 
the Caribbean transshipment triangle, studies made by PCA (Panama Canal Authority), 
do not focus on the growth trends in cargo volume in the Asia-Europe route but on 
America-Europe-Asia and the Americas. With regard to ports of Europe, it is assumed 
the continuity of main traffic via Suez which presents the shortest path between Asia 
and Europe (-2100 km, approximately). The effects of enlargement will be dependent 
on several conditions, including growth trends in the world economy (which 
contributes to, the higher or lower degree of trade protectionism adopted by each 
country), the price of fossil fuels (bunker prices) and the amount of fees to be applied 
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per TEU transiting the Canal
1
. The first condition has a higher grade on the other (direct 
effects on trade volume), the second acts on shipping costs (which may involve the 
choice of land routes such as the Trans-Siberian as an alternative) and the third, more 
dependent at the willingness of investors, can erode the gains achieved by ship-owners 
in the option Panama over Suez and to its attractiveness.  
In the case of Sines seen as a hub port, the constraints are not limited only to the 
variables listed above. The ports are not chosen by chance, several factors are 
contributing to this. Ducruet and Notteboom (2010) points out eleven factors affecting 
the inter-port competitiveness, Tongzon (2005) suggests eight while Vitsounis (2009) 
points nine and Zondag (2008) cites seven. If some of these factors are endogenous and 
result from the effort that port authorities should proceed within the major national 
policy options, yet others are exogenous in nature and as such, not subject to be 
controlled. One fact is certain: the lack of these qualities can reverse the ability of Sines 
in attracting traffic flows that will be absorbed by competitors and lead inevitably to a 
neutral result in what is expected from the new trans-Atlantic potential routes.  
Service lines, ports choice and the concept of centrality  
Cullinane and Wong (2012) state that: “the position of a particular port within the 
network port hierarchy relies upon the number of significant flows connected to the port 
and the origins/destinations of those flows”. In fact, the main lines of container traffic 
around the world include in their scales, some 10 to 15 ports considered the most 
important (Rudel and Taylor, 2000), the global maritime network is strongly polarized 
in a few major ports (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2010). Ports are not chosen by chance or 
apparent advantages that the observer, careless or unaware of the global shipping 
network, can perhaps assign. Ducruet and Notteboom (2012) state that "the choice of a 
port is a function of the costs and performance of global network", a definition that 
refers to the analysis of both costs and port performance. Lines determine the ports to 
scale based on partnerships and logistics networks they integrate, giving ship-owners 
obviously preferences to ports where they operate their own terminals. Given the 
incursion of these agents in logistics activities on land, their role in the selection of ports 
has become even more prevalent than previously (Brooks and Pallis, 2008). This means 
that the ports today have less power in their relationships with customers (Brooks, 
Schellinck and Pallis, 2011: 17). According to Wilsmeier and Notteboom (2009), the 
configuration of the maritime service lines are not just the result of exogenous factors 
related to the development of trade and the dispersal of economic activity in the 
hinterland; the endogenous factors related to the local environment of the port, access to 
the hinterland, the strategies of market players and government policies have a clear 
impact on how regions are connected. The public investment made in basic 
infrastructure and interconnectivity of the hinterland throw a key card in allowing fast, 
efficient and reliable land connections.  
                                                          
1
http://www.porttechnology.org/technical_papers/the_panama_canal_expansion_business_as_usual_or_g
ame_changer 
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About distance, the physical measure in which lies the concept of centrality - 
"proximity to markets of origin / destination" - (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2012), 
contrary to popular belief, is not the criterion that has more weight in the choice of ports 
or to trace routes. The reliability and overall quality of services (passing by the 
interconnectivity between modes and the speed and efficiency of operations) have a 
higher weight (Rudel and Taylor, 2000: 6). These two constraints are overcomed 
primarily through vertical integration of operations at ground on its own compliance or 
through the formation of strategic alliances.  
The centrality one attributes to Sines results of the geographic position at the 
crossroads of several east-west shipping routes (or equatorial), north-south and 
diagonal. The Strait of Gibraltar is a strategic waypoint of the global beltway which 
would certainly be an advantage for the location of Sines, if the investment in 
containerized cargo had been carried out decade and a half before. For this 
metamorphosis have passed several Mediterranean ports where the lack of technological 
adaptation was transformed into competitive advantages for the major northern ports, 
which do not despise the opportunity to increase their dominance. This scenario 
however suffered major changes and several ports along the main route gathered great 
benefits of its restructuring. This new role allowed some ports to transform quickly into 
new hubs dedicated to transshipment, by coastal feeder and inland railroad, having 
consecutively won market share in container market and rekindled the theme of the best 
option for flows inside the European continent. Saying so, Sines have not only lost the 
"boom" growth signed out in this segment as it allowed settling near two major 
intermediate hubs; Algeciras and Tanger Med. Thus, service lines evidently opted for 
these ports and created the conditions for the possession of all or part of operational 
resources, soît, the terminals.  
The choice of ports and their importance and centrality no longer obeys the equation 
where the service line (the ship-owner) chose the port and the cargo (the shipper), chose 
the service line. "This competition no longer has the character of a struggle between 
ship-owners and ports to one that involves supply chains" (Meersman, Van der Voorde 
and Vanelslander, 2002), or, between the supply chains that connect the source to the 
destination.  
From the above it can be inferred that the ports will be chosen because of the overall 
weight of players and conditioned by vested interests. This leads us to the issue of 
competition within and between ports.  
Inter-port competition, transshipment, hubs and gateways  
Even if these conditions are not insurmountable, it is not sufficient to collect and 
redistribute cargo. This activity (transshipment), even when significant, interacts little 
with the hinterland (Rodrigue, 2011: 15) and does not add value to the goods. It is 
essentially attractive in financial terms for terminal operators´ and to Port Authority’s, 
reason why all container ports try to uptake this type of activity. However, are flows 
that are in need of multiplier effect in regional terms. The transshipment is the maritime 
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equivalent of the wholesale activity on land; serves the continuity of the supply chain 
enabling the delivery of goods to distributors or final customers. The transshipment 
activity is not bound to a specific port, but to markets, as opposed to a gateway that is 
connected to the distribution of goods within. The incidence of transshipment is the 
portion of the total income of the port that is transferred from ship to ship, implying that 
the final destination of the container is another port. The larger, more a port can be 
considered as a transshipment center and an incidence above 75% puts the port as a 
"pure" transshipment hub (Rodrigue, 2011) wich, in theory, does not have hinterland 
but yes a vast foreland (Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack, 2009). A pure transshipment hub 
is more unstable with respect to a gateway port: as the volume of traffic to the gateway 
ports are sufficient, the hubs will no longer be scaled and may even become redundant, 
although several authors state that in many cases the differences between hubs and 
gateways have been blurred (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2010; Notteboom, 2012). This 
means that the scale of throughputs together with logistics networks and transport 
infrastructure can convert a racking port into a port of distribution of goods, if 
conditions arise.  
But, for Sines, not even the mere transshipment activity is guaranteed once the 
competition is close and strong. Hubs that compete directly with Sines are mainly 
located along the southern coast of Spain, were one can identify especially the port of 
Algeciras. Maersk, the reference worldwide shipping company calls Algeciras not only 
because of the comparative conditions this port has, but because Maersk operates its 
own dedicated terminal container.  
Other important ports as Huelva (mostly grain), A Coruña (small and shallow) and 
Gijón (main peninsular ore dedicated port) are not seen as immediate "threats" to the 
direct capture of cargo from the port of Sines, albeit there has been some new activity in 
the port of El Ferrol, which seems to be an attempt to anticipate the (expected) effects 
with the widening of the Panama Canal. Whatever the underlying strategy, it is 
nonetheless impressive the fact that they have expressly relocated several gantry cranes 
transported by ship from the port of Algeciras. 
Furthermore, there is a new hub in North Africa, Tanger-Med, which offers very low 
deviations and arises as a direct competitor to Sines in the attraction of traffic and cargo. 
It is a port built from scratch to become a pure "low cost" transshipment hub and 
competes through tariffs, which are based on low labor costs prevailing in the country, 
among others, such as tax breaks and financial incentives to firms to settle. In strategic 
terms, Tanger can be seen as a platform granting access to the European continent for 
cheap goods produced in North Africa, serving the Mediterranean ports as gateways. 
Very concretely, this port can arise as a direct competitor due to the presence of MSC 
and PSA, in which port they operate. PSA we had talked already, about MSC it is 
simply the main service liner operating in Sines.  
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Competitiveness and new flows of commerce  
This study is focused on the port range B-B (Barcelona-Bilbao), with which it admits 
greater Iberian competition. It was proceeded to collect available documents on the 
websites of the respective ports and also from various sources. The proposed conceptual 
model led to the drafting of a preliminary matrix (Table 1), which can constitute as a 
sieve and initial starting point for more detailed analysis in terms of competitive 
strengths and weaknesses.  
Table 1. Inter-port competition factors. Preliminary matrix of port range B-B. 
 
 
The final score Sines collects is bleak. From factors liable to be incremented highlights 
the upgrading on rail links, the extension of the area of the strategic competitive 
hinterland influence and financial performance criteria as targets of continuous 
improvement. Certainly the choice of other factors could influence the final result (the 
parameter choice for business or residential environment could assign a higher score to 
Sines, for example), or even changes in the weights exert changes in classifications. 
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Similarly, knowing that liners give greater importance to reliability and quality of 
service than to location, maybe we have been too generous in assigning such a weight to 
this factor. Above all, this analysis is intended to carry out a narrowing of the criteria 
that influence the choice for cargo concentration ports; others could also rightly be used. 
The identification and selection of a particular port are at the end, decision from major 
international ship-owners, which determine whether a given port operations are feasible 
and profitable, but the decision to invest in infrastructure to provide adequate service of 
rail connections to the hinterland, for example, no longer depends on them, and it is a 
paradox, since it is an extremely important factor which weighs in the decision of 
choice. However, the presence of infrastructure does not necessarily guarantee traffic 
since the service lines can select ports were they provide services as changes arose in 
business opportunities (Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack, 2009).  
Financial efficiency as a net revenue per tonne in Sines, has the worst record among the 
major Iberian ports, which is proof that the movement of bulk presents lower results per 
tonne than the unitized cargo, with higher value, although these financial indicator do 
not demonstrate the performance of the port but that of the PA (De Langen, Nijdam and 
Van der Horst, 2007: 24). The indicators on which underpin the competitiveness criteria 
are subjective in nature, because the international comparison is difficult to accomplish, 
due to lack of standardization and the different collection methods. This analysis was 
used essentially as a proxy for the port choice by shipping companies. The main 
function of the indicators should not be to serve exclusively as institutional information, 
or as a method of comparison between ports, but rather to assume that the potential 
benefits of the port passes for both users and consumers (De Langen, Nijdam and Van 
der Horst, 2007: 32).  
Intra-port competition; different agents  
The growing pressure of competition happens also at intra-port level. Sines like other 
ports faces economic uncertainty and financial volatility in the coming years, at a time 
the economic growth of Western countries deteriorates. In fact, due to the great 
uncertainty, each of the participating players will try to pre-empt others through 
strategic moves which will have a crucial impact on the decision-making variables, 
such as costs, prices, supply and demand. Several forces act within this circle and are 
not free of conflict of interests.  
Shippers (cargo owners or/and freight forwarders), intend to get the best shipping 
prices. Fewer services do incur in more expensive freights due to defect of competition. 
The logistics operators wish to obtain the maximum benefit between costs and 
revenues and capture market share from competitors. Their instruments of power are 
rates, capacity, flexibility and speed of delivery. As instruments of that power they have 
the pricing, the technology used and the value added service. From terminal operator’s 
side, we saw the introduction of fixed capacity of unloading at terminals and even a 
policy of prices reducing. The ports also intend the maximization of profit. 
Additionally may want to minimize costs through the supply chain, or to maximize the 
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volume of cargo handled. Their negotiating tools are the price charged, maritime access 
to the port and concessions policy.  
In conclusion, each actor within the activities inside and outside the port perimeters has 
its own agenda and tools in order to accomplish strategic objectives. However, most 
ports ultimately depend on the behavior of its largest and most influential customers: 
ship-owners. The main objectives of those are minimizing the overall costs. For this 
feature they have instruments such as the bargaining power, which ultimately depend on 
their size. The danger of dependency to a shipping company lies in the potential for 
relocation, which in the case of Sines would be disastrous. As the penalties for 
relocation are relatively mild, service lines tend to change their ports of call with 
relative ease.  
Efficiency, productivity and reliability  
The efficiency of a port system is a critical factor for the efficiency of the countries by 
they own (Tongzon and Heng, 2005) and is mentioned by several authors as being the 
main factor for choosing a port (Aronietis, et al, 2010), the reason which there was the 
concern for attribute the second place in the criteria constraints of port competitiveness. 
The concept of efficiency, while distinct, is closely related to the concept of 
productivity, largely because of the idea that port performance (as any company), 
improves as more efficient and productive is (Serrano and Trujillo, 2006). As a factor of 
competitiveness, efficiency can be measured in terms of financial performance. 
According to Goss (1990: 211): "any improvement in the economic efficiency of a 
seaport will enhance economic welfare by increasing the producers’ surplus for the 
originators of the goods being exported and consumers' surplus for the final consumers 
of the goods being imported”. For many ports increased cargo handled, and thus the 
productivity of the terminals, has become a challenge to face, especially for ports that 
receive large container ships, which, due of slow steaming, put great pressure on port 
operations in terms of response times to fulfill (ship turnaround times). The longer a 
ship remains moored more expensive will be the final price to be paid, which lead us to 
the issue of productivity.  
Productivity, or operational efficiency, is measured by the maximization of the 
equipment and, ceteris paribus, the inability of a port may give rise to congestion and 
delays and this can be mitigated by the introduction of better equipment such as semi-
automated cranes. Other operational efficiency measures dealing with capital and labor, 
are absent from this study because it is considered that, even imperfect, productivity 
analysis of a port based on the total cargo volume continues to be the simplest to 
perform and the one ports mostly rely. In productivity analysis was used a production 
function average, in which the movement (in TEU), of a port is function of the number 
of terminals, the length of the pier and the number of gantry cranes in use. It was found 
the differences between the potential annual movements in TEU with real movement 
(Appendix 1). In this aspect, Sines shows weak competitiveness with its four container 
cranes (the fifth and the sixth were not at place by the time this study was conducted), 
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especially if compared to Valencia, which exceeds, by far, the average of other ports, 
even though when a port exceeds its planned capacity it can cause inefficiencies. This 
assessment cannot however be remiss that terminal productivity is not the productivity 
of the port, nor that port performance can be confused with the performance of 
terminals.  
The reliability of service is the result of several global parameters, or good or bad 
operational indicators (speed and flexibility of operations, delays in operation, strikes 
and other social disturbances) and represents the perception that customers have of the 
general performance of a given port. An important element related to the efficiency and 
reliability of the ports is the labor factor. Labor costs account for about 60% to 70% of 
operating costs, even in capital-intensive container terminals. As the demand for labor 
varies greatly from one day to the other, the working arrangements should be flexible 
enough to meet the supply of labor, without imposing excessive costs, reducing the 
turnaround time of ships in port and proportional risk of rupture (Merk et al , 2011: 26). 
Finally, reliability translates into a conclusive reading that results from efficiency and 
productivity, and provides the metric for the reputation of a port.  
The measurement of port performance: efficiency or effectiveness?  
Brooks and Pallis (2008) define strategy as related to factors associated with the 
services provided (product-market scope) and also the strategic plan itself. According to 
the authors, the strategic performance can be evaluated through internal performance 
indicators (efficiency) or external, from stakeholders (effectiveness). According to those 
authors, efficiency and effectiveness are related but distinct concepts. If the terminal 
operator decides to increase the efficiency of the terminal and to obtain it he maintains 
more ships moored, the use of the terminal increases but the delay time also increases, 
which does not fit the expectations of the customers. This option will result in a 
tradeoff; efficiency is achieved at the expense of effectiveness. The effectiveness is 
therefore related to the expectations of the various stakeholders, which do not always 
coincide. Customer-focused PA's tend to have an attitude of effectiveness. The 
difference between port administrations that follow a line of efficiency and pursuing 
other based management effectiveness lies therefore in the attention given to indicators 
that measure the port activity in the abstract, or which focus is centered on customers’ 
expectations. The measurement of service quality, rather than its quantification, happens 
to be extremely important because it represents the line of measurement by customers; 
efficiency is important to improve the levels of port operations, but is of secondary 
importance, customer satisfaction is the critical indicator that should be measured in an 
organization focused on efficacy (Brooks and Pallis, 2008: 10).  
2. Sines as a logistics gateway  
The ZILS (Sines Industrial & Logistics Platform)  
It is no coincidence that the ZILS was considered Sines´ life insurance by the president 
of APS (AICEP´s Portugal Global interview, Sept. 2008). In fact it is assumed that the 
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integrated development of the entire region depends on the concentration of diversified 
industries that, by processing specific local comparative advantages, promote 
employment, entrepreneurship and vocational skills. This focus initially on the outskirts 
of the port, should promote, through spillover effects (ripple effect), the launch of 
activities of great value added based on new technologies and I & D, whose synergies 
allow the stimulation of regional economic potential.  
Logistics platforms of merchandises fit into the overall scheme of supply chains of 
goods and cannot dissociate itself from the policies of general transport planning. The 
main use of this market is to provide various types of logistics supply chain by covering 
the entire production process: since the transportation of raw materials to final waste 
reprocessing. According to the plan presented in 2006 and to which was attributed the 
name "Portugal Logistics", one of the goals would be networking the main Atlantic 
ports with logistics platforms by UIC gauge. A national network of Logistics Platforms 
presented in 2008 (Decree 152/2008 of 5th August), based on the "Portugal Logistics", 
intended to give to those platforms a strategic location in spatial terms. For what 
concerns us directly for this work stands out the location of Logistics Platform of 
Poceirão (Project LOGZ), with a total of 220ha and designed to encompass the flow of 
goods to and from Autoeuropa, and scheduled to have a direct link to Sines.  
Again, the PET assumes the strategic importance of logistics platforms location as 
multimodal corridors and redistribution links of goods and commodities. In which 
concerns for Sines in terms of logistics, some measures arise from the reading of this 
Plan: one will be regarding the implementation of the Logistics Single Window (Janela 
Única Logística - already foreseen since 2006 occur with the implementation of 
Logistics Portugal) based on Port Single Window, which is just a tiny drop of water in 
the aridness which the Plan contemplates the whole sector.  
Transport corridors and distribution networks  
The development of intermodal transport modes provided new opportunities which in 
turn had a major impact on the associated logistics. This produced a certain paradox: 
according to Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack (2006), for the customer, the geographical 
space became irrelevant as to the supplier of this type of service, routes or modes of 
transport have assumed even greater importance. The global production and 
consumption have substantially changed the distribution with the emergence of regional 
production systems as well as major consumer markets. No single location can 
efficiently meet the distribution requirements of such a complex web of activities.  
The definition of urban area considered it as the hierarchy of certain services and 
functions as a corridor is a structure that organizes interactions within this hierarchy 
(Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack, 2006). The transportation corridor provides the 
capability to physical movement and promotes accessibility and movement of flows of 
production, distribution and consumption. In this conceptual model Sines regulates 
freight traffic inbound and outbound serving as an interface between regional, national 
and global systems. Corridors have been becoming the main structure for the 
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accessibility to the interior and which through the ports gain access to the distribution 
system. Strategies are therefore increasingly going through the control of distribution 
channels so as to ensure unimpeded movement of containerized cargo.  
Delimitation of the frontier (spatial structure)  
The existence of a obvious "missing link" presupposes the need for a direct link from 
Sines to the Logistics Platform of Badajoz, gateway to the competitive hinterland which 
without it, there will be no growth potential due to the exiguity of the natural hinterland 
(Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Sines rail network: the “missing link”. 
 
               Source: Adapted from REFER (2013).  
At the origin of the current network lies the fact that, at the beginning, this railroad has 
been designed for Sines as both a liquid and dry bulk port, including unloading of coal 
to feed the thermo electric plants of Sines and Pego (near Abrantes, up north). This 
tortuous path (red color), exemplifies the concept of friction in a visible way and brings 
out the existence of a missing link, which could be a new rail line between Ermidas-
Évora-Badajoz or Ermidas-Poceirão-Badajoz.  
Spanish markets localized at Provinces of Extremadura and Madrid are the obvious to 
gain market share in the competitive hinterland, which should be the main immediate 
concern to policy makers once transporting goods to the "heart of Europe" does not pass 
the scrutiny of a more detailed analysis: not only is there no continuity in high speed 
(Madrid-Irun-France), as there is yet no interoperability (e.g., France-Germany), i.e., for 
some many years this assumption will be pure illusion. 
The missing link 
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3. Quantitative analysis: Gini´s and Location coefficients  
To obtain an overview of the national and Iberian port market as a way to identify the 
individual from the collective, we used some basic statistical models whose use in the 
social sciences is well documented. Thus, in empirical terms, we proceeded to an 
analysis made by two different approaches: i) study of the degree of dependence of 
loads on the most important continental Iberian ports, through the Gini coefficient, and 
ii) application of the Location coefficient between Sines and an Iberian port range, to 
assess the convergence or divergence of growth recorded in the last decade.  
The cargo dependancy: the Gini coefficient  
The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality commonly used to calculate the 
inequality in income distribution, but can be applied to the degree of concentration that 
directly highlights the extent to which each port depends on certain traffic of freights. It 
is assumed that a high Gini coefficient shows a high specialization / dependence in a 
given cargo. Values near zero indicate perfect equality while values close to one reveal 
a high inequality. The representation of the Gini index is given by the following 
expression, known as Brown´s formula:  
 
 
G = Gini coefficient of port i 
X = Cumulated proportion of cargoes when they have equal percentages. 
Y = Cumulated proportion of cargoes percentage. 
k = 1, 2…, 10 = cargoes (%). 
 
 
Accordingly, and to assess the degree of diversity / specialization of national ports 
together with the Iberian ports, goods were disrupted into ten major categories. National 
ports chosen for this analysis are responsible for 97% of total throughput handled in the 
country by sea and the eleven major Spanish ports account for about 90% of the total 
cargo handled in Spain. Table 2 presents the sample selection of the main Iberian ports. 
The data used were taken from the series published on the website of IPTM, IP, in the 
case of Portuguese ports and from Puertos del Estado, in the case of Spanish ports, 
broken down into 10 types of categories that correspond to equipment using and 
specific infrastructure. They refer to 2010.  
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Table 2: Main 16 Ports and cargo throughput broken down into 10 categories. 
 
 
From the analysis performed using the Gini coefficient (Appendix 2), it appears that, 
from the 5 ports in port range B-B, Bilbao is the port that displays a lower reliance on a 
certain type of cargo. So, we can state that is the highly diversified port of the range, 
with a Gini of 0.445. Barcelona appears in second with 0.472, followed by Sines 
(0.677), Algeciras (0.683) and, finally, Valencia that with an index of 0.764 is the more 
dependent port in a given cargo, the containerized goods, the one with the higher 
relative share (71.8%), a real container port indeed (Appendix 3). In the case of Sines, 
although the increased growth of containerized cargo in recent years, it can be said that 
it is still a port specialized in liquid bulk, a condition that can be adjusted in the coming 
years if the trend on containerization follows. Figure 4 gives us a more accurate idea of 
the differences recorded for each port.  
Figure 4: Scatterplot. 
 
         Source: Own elaboration.  
Ports Cargoes (thous. Ton.)
Dry bulk
        agricultural
        ore 
        coal 
        others GS
Liquid bulk
        crude oil
        refined
        liquified gases
Breakbulk
Containers
Ro-ro
A Coruña; Algeciras; 
Aveiro; Barcelona; 
Bilbao; Cartagena; 
Castellón;                      
El Ferrol; Gijón; 
Huelva; Leixões; 
Lisboa; Setúbal;    
Sines; Tarragona; 
Valencia 
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The Location coefficient (LC)  
The LC was used by Lopes (2001: 58-65) for the calculation of regional imbalances, 
and have been applied to the breakdown of the workforce by three main industries. This 
study applies the LC analysis on the behavior of cargo volume of the 5 main Iberian 
ports, comparing two periods: 2002 and 2011. It is intended to place each port on the 
deviations from the average of the port range, it means, how much each of them should 
have grown to follow the movement, on average, of all five ports. The purpose is to 
verify that the port that interests us most - Sines - followed or diverged in the trend 
demonstrated by its main competitors. In essence, in this study we have two variables 
that stand in confrontation: the growth of a certain type of cargo (x) and the total 
cargoes (y), in which, for each port we´ll have as the proportions of each type of cargo 
and the set of cargoes that will fit in the set.  
The LC can then be obtained from:  
 
In the case of growth asymmetries, evolution can only be considered against a pattern, 
in which case this is the default of the behavior of all 5 ports and the evolution of 
imbalances is analyzed by comparing the actual trend with what should have been found 
for if the differences were not registered.  
 
 
    δ is the growing rate registered in that period for the 5 ports set  
        δi is the effective growth rate of a specific cargo at port i 
  
Through LC we intend to verify the deviation (δi - δ) between the behavior of a given 
port and the group behavior in general. If the variable x is dissociated into goods of 
different nature j (j = 1,2, 3 ... m), the corresponding identity (3.3) can take the 
following form:  
 
From the previous expressions built on relative components we turn into the absolute 
value of the components by multiplying the two terms of identities by the absolute value 
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of the variable registered at the beginning of the period. From (3.4) we go to xijδij whose 
sum over j originates: 
  
 
 
As  we obtain  
 
 
 
 
 
The component associated with (δi'-δ) reflects the expected effects of global features on 
a group of ports and so is called global component or "port component" while the 
associated with (δi - δi '), that puts in confront the effective evolution of the port and the 
one that should have been in it from the different types of cargo if they had behaved 
alike, in average, occurred in the group of ports, is referred as "cargo component". The 
two will explain the deviation (δi - δ) between the behavior of the port and that of all the 
5 ports.  
Table 3 summarizes cargo movements at the port range, grouped into three main 
categories: Dry bulk, liquid bulk and general cargo (including break bulk and 
containerized cargoes), having excluded Ro-ro traffic since as Sines doesn´t show any 
movement of this type this would cause overestimation of the data.  
 
 
 
 
δj - δ = cargo component: highlights the behavior of a certain type of cargo among the set (ex: containers vs. total cargo)
δij - δj  = port component (or global): emphatizes the behavior of one type of cargo in one specific port in face to the behavior 
of the same cargo in the 5 ports set containers in port i vs. containers in the  5 ports altogether)
x i = represents the total volume handled at port i (tonnes)
δi ´ = is the growth rate port should have verified if any type of cargo had evolved as in the case of the 5 ports together
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Table 3: Cargo partition in port range B-B: 2002 to 2011 (thousands tonnes). 
 
 
 
If we multiply the R02 matrix (year 2002), by the vector δj we find the necessary 
addictions to calculate the vectors δ´j  
[-0,288 0,305 0,754] * [R02] = [29444 16145 11758 2717 17972]  
as such,  
 
In the possession of all elements for the determination of the components, the results are 
summarized in the next table. With them we can elaborate Figure 5 (Shift-share 
Analysis).   
Cargo Algeciras Barcelona Bilbao Sines Valencia ∑
Solid bulk 2.839 3.383 4.625 5.796 5.797 22.440
Liquid bulk 17.913 9.930 13.125 14.318 1.624 56.910
General cargo 32.889 18.688 12.051 26 25.393 89.047
Total 53.641 32.001 29.801 20.140 32.814 168.397
Cargo Algeciras Barcelona Bilbao Sines Valencia ∑
Solid bulk 1.567 3.544 4.451 4.041 2.374 15.977
Liquid bulk 23.036 10.761 19.763 16.151 4.530 74.241
General cargo 53.847 28.759 9.445 5.600 58.571 156.222
Total 78.450 43.064 33.659 25.792 65.475 246.440
2002
2011
δ (growth rate in the period) = 0,463
δi ( i = Al;Ba;Bi;Si;Va) 
δAl= 0,463; δBa= 0,346; δBi= 0,129; δSi= 0,281; δVa= 0,995
δj ( j = GS; GL; Fr; Co; Ro)
δGS = -0,288; δGL = 0,305; δGe = 0,754
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Figure 5: Shift-share Analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that Sines displays a remarkable growth on cargo component, which, as 
we have seen earlier, marks the effective evolution of the port and the one it should 
have been, if the different types of cargo had behaved as, on average, occurred in the 
group of ports. The cargo type highlighted is general cargo, including containerized 
cargo segment. Sines has the second higher rate which it is not surprising (in 2002 this 
type of cargo was nonexistent). It also shows that growth has been sustainable. The Port 
of Valencia is the fastest growing port - and the one that stands out among the Spanish 
ports. On the other hand, Bilbao is the port that loses more ground in the global 
approach with the others over this ten year period. As that, the port component (or 
global), which represents the evolution of the total loads handled on all ports, shows 
that Sines scores the highest negative value of the 5, namely, the growth observed in the 
bulk liquid has not been sufficiently able to correct the loss of global growth, which was 
not more penalized due to the increase in containerized cargo.  
 
Di = δi - δ
Port component = δ i´ - δ 0,504-0,463 = +0,041 0,395-0,463= -0,068 0,135-0,463= -0,328 0,548-0,463= +0,085
Cargo component = δi - δ i´ 0,346-0,504 = - 0,158 0,129-0,395= -0,266 0,281-0,135= +0,146 0,995-0,548= +0,447
0,548-0,463= +0,085
0,463-0,548= -0,085
Valencia
0,463-0,463= 0,00 0,346-0,463 = -0,117 0,129-0,463= -0,334 0,281-0,463= -0,182 0,995-0,463= +0,532
Barcelona BilbaoAlgeciras Sines
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4. Sines as a regional cluster  
Economy and regional development  
In the current context - marked by globalization and international economic integration - 
with the increasing mobility of goods, capital and human resources towards emerging 
economies, several regions of the country are facing serious problems, in particular 
those whose production process is very much based on the routine and massed industrial 
phases of production, or marked by stagnation in the primary sector, such as the Central 
Alentejo and much of the southern territory. This context is also marked by increasing 
competition between territories, as well as the growing importance of environmental 
issues gaining a new dimension with climate change and the need for the replacement of 
energy sources, something that creates some restrictions, but also opportunities for the 
development of regions. The delocalization also imposes to the national economy the 
need to evolve into knowledge intensive activities and creativity, hence the emergency 
in the formation of clusters supported in dynamic businesses that appeals to innovation 
and diversification, certainly, but also call on traditional export goods, incorporating 
comparative advantage through differentiation and upgrading of products. The view that 
an increase in the income of the poorest regions and more equitable access to public 
goods oriented to the satisfaction of basic needs would lead to their development 
(redistributive point of view), changed in order to meet the new realities: the need to 
combine the aspects of economic and social cohesion with the competitiveness and 
environmental sustainability.  
As a national objective, it is not enough to appeal for the internationalization of firms 
and the discovery of new export markets. It is also necessary to identify which 
companies have that potential, because the export markets tend to select the most 
efficient companies. Hence the importance of investing in high added value and capital-
intensive sectors, to the foreign market, and the labor-intensive and lower value for the 
internal market, particularly as import substitutes. But the ability to put goods and 
services in foreign markets does not exhaust the process of internationalization of 
production: the presence of foreign capital is also a factor of competitiveness given the 
natural selectivity of the same. This issue takes on greater significance and relevance if 
we consider the low level of capitalization shown by a relevant part of national 
enterprises.  
The process of "clustering"  
Clusters are defined as a population of interdependent organizations operating in the 
same value chain and geographically concentrated (Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack, 
2006). However, in this specific case, Sines can be described as a multidimensional 
cluster, displaying some territorial discontinuity. Ports and cities interact across 
multiple dimensions: economic, social, environmental and cultural, but in the case of 
Sines and by virtue of its remoteness relative to large cities (which happens to be a 
benefit in the set of priceless environmental assets), the chalked clustering model passes 
necessarily to be singular.  
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From the starting embryonic point constituted by the ZILS emerges a trend of diversity 
in the installed activities which most visible example in the impact on the region's 
economy and jobs are the factories ARTLANT, PTA and Ibercoal. It is units of this 
size, from medium-high-tech sectors of activity, high-value added, targeted for exports 
and to new markets, which should guide the effort to create attractive conditions to turn 
Sines into a technological excellence center and a national reference for subsidiary 
activities. The extension of this trend to contiguous areas will be the next step to plan 
and execute. Within this prism it conveys certainly proceed to an exhaustive survey of 
all the capabilities of attraction and establishment of competitive industries that can 
benefit from the whole existing and to be developing infrastructure in the near future, 
something worthy to figure in the annals of large implemented projects at national level 
(Figure 6).  
Figure 6. A regional “mega-cluster”. 
 
 
The map of development planning of the region should obey to a triangulation in 
which the vertices consists in Sines as "bridgehead", Beja and Évora, natural poles for 
logistics, concentration of industrial activity and population settling. In fact, it will 
actually be a parallelogram if the angles are extended to include the Estremoz deposits 
of marbles, at north, and the Pyrite Belt, at south. We start from a limited idea of growth 
pole for a stronger perception of development region.  
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Sines prospective scenario for the horizon 2030  
From the Integrated Scenario prepared by iTREN-2030 for transport and energy 
demand, based on economic growth forecasts for the various regions of the world and 
the repercussion that such occurrences will have on freight traffic carried through the 
Panama Canal, the following three prospective scenarios were elaborated: i) Strong 
Growth Scenario ii) Moderate Growth Scenario, and, iii) Stagnation Scenario (Table 4).  
Table 4: Prospective Scenarios for 2030. 
 
 
With a resumption of maritime traffic flows to pre-crisis levels driven by strong 
economic growth in emerging and conditioned by a weak economic growth of Western 
economies, facing a forecast in which demand for shipping varies in line with the prices 
of fuel and in growing environmental pressures to reduce the traffic associated with the 
terrestrial mode, we have defined a Moderate Growth Scenario which arises as the 
more likely to occur.  
From the Moderate Growth Scenario was undertaken a further sensitivity analysis 
(Table 5). Sines arises as a gateway port of entry and exit of goods and commodities in 
the Iberian Peninsula and transshipment to ports in Northern Europe and Western 
Mediterranean, made possible by the use of larger ships that can pass through the 
Panama Canal and to the north-south deviation that enlargement provides to ship-
owners, also registering trade flows growth with Mercosur. The increased traffic flow 
Scenario 3:Scenario 2:
 eastbound  traffic far superior than 
westbound traffic
Stagnation (or contraction) of the 
global commercial flows 
> Strong global development (global)                   
>  Panama exponencial increase of traffic
Post-crisis strong recovery both in economy 
and trade
Scenario 1:
Strong growth Scenario Moderate growth Scenario Stagnation Scenario
> Weak growth of global trade 
(local to local)
> Moderate growth driven by emerging 
countries (regional)
> Global distribution networks in Sines (and 
inland) to Europe  
> Emphasizes the importance of 
distribution centers in Sines to provide 
the Iberian Peninsula
> Rapid rail connection to Spain and increase of 
its geographical areas of influence 
> Shipping prices remain relatively constant
> Trend for the existence of Local 
Distribution Centers 
World trade
Logistics
> Traffic via Panama grows enough to 
compete with Suez
Transportation 
Networks > Prices of land transport increased 
considerably
> A rail link to the competitive hinterland 
carried out in phases, balanced with the 
increased SSS
> Big boost of the Short-sea shipping
> Terminal V. da Gama runs almost at full 
capacity 
> Sustained Development in ZILS
Infrastructures
> Great development of ZILS
> New Container Terminal (Vasco da Gama II) to 
to cope with the increased freigths 
> Traffic via Panama does not 
record significant changes
> The growth of the containerized 
cargo segment is minimal
> ZILS loss of competitiveness
> Prices of all transport modes 
worsen rapidly
>  Competitive hinterland remains 
very low
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also results in a major growth opportunity to the distribution networks - primarily rail 
and sea - since price increasing on road transport requires a lower cost option.  
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
 
Despite a relative parity between Panama and Suez, the latter will continue to be the 
main strategic point of passage along the global beltway, namely due to the fact that 
represents a 2.000 km shorter path between Asia and Northern Europe. The flows with 
Southern Asia will probably be maintained in opposition to those arising in both coasts 
of North America, which are declining. This analysis also reveals, from the standpoint 
of geopolitical and geostrategic, high exposure to political and social events, namely, 
the strong current vulnerability of global marine network due to the need of traffic flows 
by narrow channels. (However, if for political issues, the Suez Canal closes, the game 
will probably change). 
The widening of the Panama Canal: what results to Sines?  
With the growing size of container ships, which forces the existence of a smaller 
number of scales, the port chosen by the shipping companies shall, in addition to other 
factors, have absorption capacity of its hinterland and quality and efficiency of 
intermodal connections, aspects that are materialized in the way ship-owners choose the 
ports of call for their service lines.  
The Panama Canal is currently far from being able to influence the flow of global 
maritime commerce due to the limiting scale of vessels it supports. However, with the 
enlargement of the passage, routes around the world (round-the-world liner services), 
will again be envisaged, which can revive the network service (Notteboom and 
Rodrigue, 2009). In principle, with the expansion of the Panama Canal, there may be a 
relative parity between the Suez in terms of capacity. But these expectations can be 
subjected to some contention in result of a lower aggregate demand, the trend for 
"regionalism" trade, the increase in fuel prices and the choice for alternative routes at 
the expense of current routes (Figure 7).  
Positive aspects Negative aspects
The increase in road traffic in the 
hinterland may be one result; 
need to transfer to rail
Sensitivity Tests Definition
Larger ships
Larger ships carry more goods, economies of scale favor lower prices. (Take 
into account the flows originated through the Panama Canal in terms of deep-
sea and between EU ports, in terms of short-sea shipping (SSS)
CO2 reduction by shifting to  
feeder. Larger scale leads to 
potential port cost reduction 
North/South deviation
Ports of the Atlantic seaboard become more competitive. Ship-owners prefer 
transshipment than call ports  further north. Sines, deepwater port, receives 
post-Panamax ships
Decrease in ton / km due to 
smaller journeys made
Overhead railway. Possible 
referral to the road to decongest
Rising prices in the 
hinterland (transportation 
and logistics)
The rising price of fuel and fees on road transport increment hinterland 
transportation costs  (c. 10%)
Decline of land transport. Modal 
shift from road to rail and sea
Increasing the time required for 
the delivery of the goods
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Figure 7. Alternative routes and regionalism. 
 
      Source: Own elaboration.  
Another issue relates at the cost of the tariffs levied on containerized traffic in transit 
through the Panama Canal since the high financing investment may lead to an increase 
in the rates charged by the PCA, resulting in the loss of attractiveness for that passage
2
. 
To this is added the price increases with labor that is already happening in some of the 
emerging Asian economies and which might encourage more local trade at the expense 
of long-distance trade.  
Final considerations on Sines in the horizon 2030  
Based on a Moderate Growth Scenario, additional sensitivity analyzes outlined show 
that it is still possible to watch an increasing trade via the Panama Canal and, as an 
option for reducing transport costs associated with fuel prices, service lines are 
redefined so as to focus on distribution platforms through SSS (short-sea shipping). 
With the redesign of logistics distribution networks, road transport will be surpassed by 
rail within the competitive hinterland, and by maritime, over the long haul. Thus, Sines 
will emerge as a port located on the Atlantic seaboard with strong chances of being 
chosen as a new global maritime network node, as transshipment hub, or preferably as a 
gateway - which may be significantly positive if players involved can create 
transnational networks supporting land redistribution. The rail links, the overall port 
performance and the actions taken to increase the level of competitiveness, play a role 
that will surely make all the difference for Sines in getting a higher status or, the other 
way around, of less importance in the port hierarchy.  
                                                          
2
 Panama Canal Authority has substantially increased the rate of $ 40 per TEU in 2006 to $ 72 in 2009, an 
increase of 80%. In 2011, the rates increased slightly to $ 74 per TEU. This means that the increases 
already captured about 40% of the potential cost savings which decreases a substantial part of the 
expected gains (Rodrigue and Notteboom, in: PTI Journal, issue no. # 52, Nov. 2011). 
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5. Final Report - Global and Strategic Vision; a possible synthesis  
The geographical location vis-à-vis the maritime chain  
The globalization of logistics networks emphasizes the importance of the relationship 
between the development of a port within the global supply chains (Notteboom and 
Winkelmans, 2001) and the development of the local region (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 
2005), because the ports do not compete alone as simple local cargo handling points but 
yes as crucial vertices of the global chains (Ducruet and Notteboom, 2010) and the port 
of Sines cannot be dissociated from the logistics distribution network to which it 
belongs. A port that is both a gateway ensures large field circulations cargo in the 
inland. The optimal management of these flows in the global space distribution will 
have to give particular attention to costs, time and reliability.  
With the widening of the Panama Canal, the passage of larger vessels may encourage 
the option for Sine’s strategic positioning since the economies of scale resulting will 
cause fewer ports of call and traffic concentration at specific hubs. It should however be 
borne in mind that, like most ports, Sines is dependent on its main clients: the ship-
owners, which are the basis of the allocation process of more or less centrality and 
greater or lesser importance in terms of port hierarchy. The issue of “centrality” of a 
port from the point of view of the ship-owner choice has been subject of great debate 
among experts. This position is supported by the strategic perspective with one looks to 
centrality, the global preferences of ship-owners by minimizing costs and what is meant 
by this, as Rudel and Taylor (2000: 89) state: "time advantages on the sea leg do not 
necessarily imply cost reductions ". For those who rely solely on the reclassification of 
Sines within the hierarchy based on the apparent advantage of gains attained through 
reduction of time with distance in relation to Mediterranean or northern European 
ports, this is an argument that falls to the ground. 
If the last word belongs to the ship-owners, the choice for ports of call for large ULCS's 
(Ultra Large Container Ship), the absence of appealing conditions of a port (which 
reveals in the form of competitive factors) both in the existence of infrastructure, 
logistics nodes and reliable connections to the hinterland, will reproduce those 
repulsive effects.  
The core of competitive strength offered - the geographical horizontality of Sines 
compared with Panama - is not sufficient to explain its choice. The attractiveness of this 
criterion only hypothetically justified as Sines is not an isolated piece of chess in 
international trade flows board, which, according to Rodrigue (2011: 7), "(...) physical 
flows may not necessarily use the most direct path, but the path of least resistance." 
Therefore one has to look at the strengths and weaknesses of the logistics chain and 
aspects related to different levels of friction once the distribution increasing prefers 
reliability of service. The reliability regards indirect costs caused by delays or damage 
occurred in the handling of cargo (Tongzon, 2008) and this trend has grown in such a 
way that, according to Maersk, (Antwerp Port Authority Newsletter Volume 14, No. 64, 
July 2011, p. 11), "Reliability is the new price war. Customers do not look for the 
 29  
 
cheapest price; they look for reliability of services." The competitiveness of a port is 
above all the product of efficiency in the provision of services required by users 
(Brooks and Pallis, 2008:9) and attractiveness is only one prerequisite that enables a 
port to gain competitiveness (Ng, 2006).  
Towards a potential increase in traffic and starting first to blur, inter alia, the main 
conditions set out in, to Sines, corseted by the smallness of its hinterland, there remains 
two possibilities: first, will be to constitute as an enhancer of the outbreak for a regional 
industrial cluster which creates conditions for increasing exports and attracting cargo 
flows to its competitive hinterland - ways to create absorption - constituting an Iberian 
gateway. The second will be to constitute into a simple node of transshipment of 
containerized goods, which does not convert the port, in the medium term, in a dynamic 
regional pivot.  
The nature of Sines and the direct competition  
Sines remains, as prior seen, as a very specialized liquid bulk port, although the 
containerized cargo segment is being gradually rising in importance (Appendix 4). The 
growth of this type of cargo, however, was not enough to put Sines within the growth 
average observed in its counterparts. Thus, we can state that, in the overall assessment, 
has been relatively losing ground against competitors in these last ten years. But it will 
take some restraint on the analysis of these numbers: not only compares a group of ports 
which contains two major hubs in Europe as the economic reality of the two countries is 
fairly distinct. It is still impressive however, and to serve as a collation, the growth that 
occurs especially in the port of Valencia.  
To not subvert the outcome of this analysis should be recalled that a port is a cluster of 
economic activity where a large number of firms provide goods and services, and 
together create different port products. Assess the port´s overall performance from 
aggregate indicators can distort the assessment between ports. The main port 
performance indicator used by ports remains throughput volume, however there is 
several limitations to its use: i) adding up throughput volumes of different commodities 
to one aggregated throughput figure limits the value of a comparison between ports (one 
tonne of oil is different from one tonne of fruit juice), ii) the movement of cargoes does 
not tell us much about the economic impact of the port on the local region, and iii) the 
increase in cargo volume can be explained by international trade flows and not by the 
performance of a port (De Langen, Nijdam and Van der Horst, 2007: 24).  
Assigning a dimension that many authors give to the necessity for the existence of a 
diverse portfolio of activities, to ensure greater operational flexibility and a lower risk in 
face of prices fluctuations of raw materials, Sines should pursue the path of growth in 
containerized segment without losing its vocation as “energy” port. The recent 
condition of first national port for exports should continue to be promoted using all port 
marketing strategies in order to attract more customers who export by sea and thus by 
increasing demand, help creating conditions for the establishment of more regular lines.  
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The supply of transport  
Economic development is increasingly linked to the development in transport. The 
reduction of time has become a key requirement since the dispatch of goods and 
commodities through the intermodal chain, to final delivery to the consumer. The 
modes of transportation join the productive factors in a complex network of 
relationships between producers and consumers and as a result we can obtain a more 
efficient division of production by exploiting comparative advantages as well as the 
means to develop economies of scale. The productivity of space, capital and labor are so 
enhanced with distribution efficiency.  
In terms of spatial economics, the delimitation of the border where Sines competes for 
traffic on competitive hinterland forces to study the spatial location and the expansion 
of its distribution network. This expansion is mainly due to the process of 
rationalization and specialization of rail traffic, whose success depends however in the 
increased capacity, speed and unitization of general cargo via container. Thus the 
railroad that serves the port of Sines will be the catalyst for fixing various logistical and 
industrial clusters of heteroclite nature, along the corridor that links the port to inland 
urban areas or to industrial centers and concomitant rapid runoff flows originated in the 
hinterland. Production plants as Embraer plant, located in the district of Évora, certainly 
contributes and requires, at a same time, that the railway network responds to these 
conditions. By virtue of our geographical condition we have to adapt our connections to 
the rest of Europe and in conjunction with Spain, whether through evolution to the 
European gauge, either by matching network electrification, strengthening resistance 
couplings or adapting the control system and signaling of rail traffic. What is at stake is 
the question of interoperability allowing Portuguese trains enter Spain without 
difficulty, as has been claimed by various economic agents.  
The existence of a missing link presupposes the need for a direct link from Sines to the 
Logistic Platform of Badajoz, gateway to the competitive hinterland without which 
there will be no potential growth due to a shortage of natural hinterland. The connection 
of southern ports to the logistics platform of Poceirão and from that to Madrid was until 
recently a priority. Notwithstanding and recently, the EC / TEN-T proceeded to rewrite 
what is understood as "core networks", predicting that the communication axis from 
Sines to Spain presents a path that passes through Lisbon (via Poceirão?) and Aveiro. 
The link to the "Central Corridor" (Priority Project 16 via Badajoz) that would allow 
to get to Madrid in the shortest time was postponed until 2030. The Logistics Platform 
of Badajoz is an essential node to connect Sines to flows of goods with origin / 
destination in Extremadura and the Autonomous Community of Madrid, optimizing 
competition in relation to Algeciras and the Iberian hinterland. If this connection not 
occurs, will contribute to the loss of competitiveness and is contrary to economies of 
scale to be obtained with the formation of a regional cluster supported in port activities. 
If it is right that national government policy lacks of praxis for the restructuring of 
maritime-port sector, among political and technocratic hesitations, each government 
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unilaterally devotes time and resources drawing rail lines that do not represent common 
decisions, further fueling the confusion that persists in this matter.  
Sines as a regional cluster: potential and challenges  
The philosophy of what is proposed to Sines is something that brings us the reality of 
new maritime clusters as Turku, in Finland, more than Antwerp, Rotterdam or 
Hamburg, and this for a need to adapt to scale, resources and population. Taking the 
example of the Finnish clusters, it is no coincidence that today these regions have a 
GDP per capita among the highest in the world, with poorly unemployment rates and 
where nested professionals of various specialties and great qualifications collect results 
from the investment increase allocated to economic sectors rescued from inactivity. 
These clusters constitute the daring model way to Sines, something that poses a real 
challenge to the investment policy, which, by their size, exceeds the financial capacity 
and legal framework of the APS, which suggests its design under the strictest integrated 
national policy and subject to a fierce supervision.  
If the dematerialization of the economy led to the discontinuation or extinction of 
various production sectors once illustrative of both professionalization and qualification 
of hand labor and the quality of national production (sectors of metallurgy and 
metalworking; construction and ship repair), taking advantage of technological progress 
seen in manufacturing methods, in terms of equipment, machinery and computerized 
support tools, as well as new methods of management and optimization of productivity, 
should back to invest in these industries of the secondary. Several European countries 
have done it and have returned to have very competitive maritime industries (which 
drive a whole range of others of high-value and highly tradable, such as electronics and 
mechatronics). We have the representative case of Finnish shipyards who build the 
largest cruise ships and the German yards of Jade Weser, where gigantic oil platforms 
are built; countries where labor costs are the highest in the world!  
As a complementary way to attract people and facilitating mobility between regions not 
only the conditions attached to the business environment must be developed but also the 
residential environment. It seems clear that business and technical staff must live in or 
near cities in an attempt to minimize traffic movements. In this aspect, the region's 
potential, the beauty of the landscapes, the quality of the fishery resources and its 
beaches coupled with the fact of being an uncluttered area with plenty of space, can 
create special conditions for setting an educated population with high professional 
qualifications.  
The shift in world´s economic paradigm - and to which the nations have to respond -, 
represents the displacement of the locus of world trade, as different countries occupy the 
top positions on the international scene; is facing this new environment that policies 
have to be implemented and adequate. However, it is essential that the economic model 
to adopt should become more concerned about environmental issues and the long-
term sustainability.  
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Increase Sines competitiveness will be focalized in the creation of a "brand" but also 
through the marketing of "location", to recognize the region as a sensitive area of 
integrated actions. The wager is also in notoriety and visibility of the port and the ZIL´s 
but should especially be cultivated and secured the image of trust in the supply chain.  
The marketing plan of Sines should be a natural extension of the strategic plan and 
shall promote the APS strategy in attracting new customers and for resident industries 
promote their business, seeking to satisfy the needs of customers, whether current and 
potential, in all inherent and complementary relationships. The marketing plan allows to 
detect opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses, enables promote management 
by objectives, basing the decision making, goal setting, quantifies deviations and their 
correction with the process, the quantification of results, a lower possibility of failure, 
control mechanisms and optimization of resources and results. From the analysis of the 
context (opportunities and threats) and from the analysis of the port (strengths and 
weaknesses), was formulated the following SWOT analysis (Table 6).  
Table 6: SWOT analysis. 
 
Source: Own elaboration.  
Finally, we must point out that, in the formation process of a cluster of excellence, the 
potential tourist and residential environment should be promoted alongside the branding 
associated to Sines, so that does not become a reducer synonymous of industrial area, 
ergo, creator of repulsion forces.  
Sines to become (Sines as mega region, not confined to port intervention area), a real 
pole of development, one welcoming regional cluster for businesses and R & D, 
undergoes a more interventionist action of APS in conjunction with other political and 
social forces, private and public, (with new multidimensional and multi-regional 
assignments?). For this to be feasible investments are needed, this at a time adverse to 
1 1
2 2
1 Attraction of large and medium-sized enterprises (economic value) 1 Northern european hubs
2 New industries with high added value 2 Western mediterranean hubs
3 Attracting FDI 3 Eastern mediterranean hubs
4 Increased exports by sea 4 Suspension of Priority Project # 16
5 Attract cargo after the widening of the Panama Canal 5 Danger of serious accident at sea, in port or pipelines
6 Regionalization of port hinterland 6 Contraction of GDP(s)
7 Establishment of a hub & spoke port 7 Contraction of world trade flows
One of the European ports that
provides better accessibility by sea
Privileged geostrategic position against the main sea routes
Remoteness from the main centers of production and consumption at national / 
Iberian 
Weaknesses Strenghts 
Poor uptake of hinterland traffic and incipient rail link to Spain
Opportunities Threats 
3
Deepening specialization and "clustering" logical actions4
3
Port capacity (deepwater port) and adjacent space ready for setting 
industrial and logistics companies
Great dependence of MSC and risk of relocation of activity of this ship-owner
Very sparsely economic (especially industrial) and population of the region 
where it is located, as well as low intensity in work activities installed
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its realization but maybe that where such an occurrence becomes more pressing and 
pledge of major impact on regional socio-economic structure.  
Now that much talk of sea-based resources of economy, it might be interesting to talk 
about investments in the exploitation of mineral resources and fisheries, fish farming, 
aquaculture and algae culture, capture and storage CO
2
 industries, "green " industries 
for the reuses and recycling of materials, desalination plants and pump stations and 
respective extensions of water transport (when the effects of severe drought that 
threatens the entire country tend to be perennial), and, why not, endogenous-based 
tourism in fields such as agro and wine industries. Such macro structuring investments - 
to name but a few - certainly alter the industrial and qualification of the regional 
workforce contributing to the implementation of some hinge industries and are 
examples of investments consistent and innovative. Consistent because they appeal to 
the usage of natural resources, innovative because they represent industrial 
development, promoting new business models, increase the technological capacity and 
stimulating competitiveness and the creation of skilled jobs.  
The "new" players: Brazil, Mercosur and China  
With regard to maritime trade with the emerging countries and in face of the potential of 
these markets in all inter / national trade, should be given due attention in an 
anticipation setting as opposed to a retroactive response. Sines in this challenge cannot 
play a secondary role (which may even constrain all future capacity growth) and staying 
summarized to its natural hinterland, but to establish a plurality of forms of businesses 
regionally and even supranational, which comes, according to what Notteboom (2012) 
recently stated: "the future of ports depends not only on expected trade flows but where 
and under what conditions these flows will move globally, seen from the perspective of 
the distribution network."  
According to APS, freight traffic between the Port of Sines and Brazil has been growing 
in recent years in the area of petroleum products, and this country reached forth 
position in 2010 in the supply of crude oil and in 2011 was the country with the highest 
rate of growth in container traffic. In 2011 there was an annual increase of 8% on 
exports, consisting Brazil as one of the leading destinations for new goods. Also in 2011 
was established a regular weekly MSC service linking Sines to South America. With 
this new service is registered an increase in the growth of trade with Brazil, both in 
export and import markets. In January 2012 the MSC opened a new regular service 
linking the ports of Sines, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina which does provide a new 
impetus to trade not only to Brazil but with Mercosur. Also in the first quarter of 2012 
the CMA-CGM, the third major global player, started connecting Sines to Africa 
through a regular line, serving ports on the west coast but could be extended to other 
destinations.  
The existence of regular lines implies the predetermination of schedules, ports of origin 
and destination, pre-established freight and integration with land and sea transportation 
chains. The scale of a port by a larger number of regular lines enhances the attraction 
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for more throughput volume, increasing performance and efficiency levels of the port, 
which can plan the scales, minimizing waiting times and costs by offering a wider range 
of destinations to lower costs and low transit times (Caldeirinha, 2010:36). On the other 
hand, when shipping companies establish regular lines, they value a range of marine 
services such as ship repair, which can be an incentive for the establishment of such 
services (Notteboom, 2012). The regular lines calling Sines are still small in number 
when compared to those serving Spanish ports, as depicted in Table 1 above.  
As for China, our exports have grown but we are still very far from speaking about 
parity. China has a growing share in the international movement of trade (both in 
absolute and relative terms), but trade flows trans-Pacific are growing faster than 
transoceanic, which could indicate possible changes becoming traffic more "located". 
Chinese investment in Portugal became the subject of great debate with the recent 
purchase of privileged actions held by the State in EDP and REN. Thus, it will be at last 
time to start working on attracting direct investment of that country to the port itself 
or/and in the hinterland?  
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APPENDIX 1. Productivity function of container terminals.  
 
 
APPENDIX 2. Gini coefficients, port range B-B (2010).  
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APPENDIX 3. Iberian Ports: disaggregated Distribution per cargo types (2010).  
 
 
 
 41  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4. Port of Sines: Disaggregated cargoes per type (2002-2011). 
 
Sines 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
mil. ton. mil. ton. mil. ton. mil. ton. mil. ton. mil. ton. mil. ton. mil. ton. mil. ton.
Solide bulk 5.796 5.396 5.415 5.801 6.180 4.962 4.353 5.295 2.995 4.041 50.234
agricultural 4,2 5 2,5 6 0 2,4 2 3,6 3 0 29
ore 66 6 4 12 4,3 8,7 0 4,2 3,5 4 113
coal 5.668 5.330 5.234 5.255 5.737 4.621 3.956 4.967 2.789 3.902 47.459
others GS 57 54 174 526 438 330 395 320 200 135 2.629
Liquid bulk 14.318 15.442 16.764 18.551 19.506 19.321 17.780 15.977 18.030 16.150 171.839
crude 8.736 9.457 9.883 10.046 9.913 9.009 8.651 7.159 8.194 7.029 88.077
refined 5.307 5.600 6.570 8.062 9.167 9.803 8.738 8.538 9.446 8.734 79.965
liquid gases 274 383 311 443 424 509 389 278 389 385 3.785
Breakbulk 26 0 45 28 36 38 50 56 77 94 450
Containers 0 24 250 658 1.473 1.977 2.964 3.050 4.410 5.050 19.856
Ro-ro 0 0,55 0 0 0 0,02 0 0 0 0 0,57
total 20.141 20.863 22.474 25.041 27.196 26.299 25.148 24.379 25.513 25.335 242.389
